Introduction to PGP

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June 24th, 2016



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What this talk will cover

- What is PGP?
- Why might you use it?
- How does it work?
- How might you use it?
- No keysigning in this talk



Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) is a data encryption and decryption computer program that provides cryptographic privacy and authentication for data communication.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pretty_Good_Privacy



What do we mean by PGP?

- PGP
- GPG (or GnuPG, or GNU Privacy Guard)
- OpenPGP (RFC 4880, RFC 2440)





A brief history of PGP

1977 - Whitfield Diffie, Martin Hellman and Ralph Merkle develop and patent public key cryptography 1991 - US Senate Bill 266

> "It is the sense of Congress that providers of electronic communications services and manufacturers of electronic communications service equipment shall insure that communications systems permit the Government to obtain the plain text contents of voice, data, and other communications when appropriately authorized by law."



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2015 - Why Johnny Still, Still Can't Encrypt: Evaluating the Usability of a Modern PGP Client

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How it works: the building blocks

The building blocks

- Symmetric cryptography
- Asymmetric (public key) cryptography
- Hashing



Symmetric cryptography

The same key is used for encryption and decryption



This has been with us for centuries...



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The same key is used for encryption and decryption



This has been with us for centuries...

Plain:	ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ
Cipher:	XYZABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVW

Using to encrypt:

Plaintext WELCOME TO THE ICTF CONFERENCE Ciphertext TBIZLJB QL QEB FZQC ZLKCBOBKZB



Symmetric encryption

Examples: AES, CAST5, Blowfish, Camellia, IDEA



Symmetric encryption

- Examples: AES, CAST5, Blowfish, Camellia, IDEA
- Problem: key distribution



Asymmetric cryptography

 Different (but linked) keys used for encryption and decryption: a private and a public key



- \blacksquare Only been around $\approx 50~{\rm years}$
- Uses mathematical properties to ensure security (eg prime number factorisation, discrete logarithm computation)



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- Solves the key-sharing problem!
- But slower than symmetric encryption (larger keys)



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- Solves the key-sharing problem!
- But slower than symmetric encryption (larger keys)
- Examples: RSA, DSA, ElGamal, ECDSA

Not quite as simple - but can be implemented in 3 lines of perl...

#!/bin/perl -sp0777i<X+d*lMLa^*lN%0]dsXx++lMlN/dsM0<j]dsj
\$/=unpack('H*',\$_);\$_='echo 16dio\U\$k"SK\$/SM\$n\EsN0p[lN*1
lK[d2%Sa2/d0\$^Ixp"|dc';s/\W//g;\$_=pack('H*',/((..)*)\$/)</pre>

Usage: rsa -k=public-key -n=rsa-modulus < msg > msg.rsa rsa -k=private-key -n=rsa-modulus < msg.rsa > msg.out



- Takes data of an arbitrary size (message) and maps it to a fixed size (digest)
- One-way



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HELLO WORLD361fadf1c712e812d198c4cab5712a79HALLO WORLDfbb80bf0d72fb5ebf03c776db4e80fe8



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HELLO WORLD361fadf1c712e812d198c4cab5712a79HALLO WORLDfbb80bf0d72fb5ebf03c776db4e80fe8

Examples: MD5, SHA-1, SHA-512









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Hashing is used to sign messages.



These signed messages can then be used as inputs to the encryption process



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The private key should be kept secret. Only the public key should be shared!



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- When encrypting to someone, you need their public key
- GPG uses a 'web of trust' you need to sign a key yourself (or trust someone else who has signed the key)
- This is what keysigning involves



Michael Howe (Sysdev) <michael.howe@it.ox.ac.uk> Short ID: 0x6853C4FA Long ID: 0x3B8BC9316853C4FA Fingerprint: 810A 24B4 83E8 B097 E7B0 4EA1 3B8B C931 6853 C4FA



Sharing keys

MIT PGP Public Key Server

Help: Extracting keys / Submitting keys / Email interface / About this server / FAQ Related Info: Information about PGP /

Extract a key

Index:
 Verbose Index:

Show PGP fingerprints for keys

Only return exact matches

Submit a key

Enter ASCII-armored PGP key here:



Clear Submit this key to the keyserver!





Search results for 'uk ox michael it howe ac'

Type bits/keyID Date User ID

pub 4096R/6853C4FA 2012-10-17 Michael Howe (Sysdev) <michael.howe@it.ox.ac.uk>





Search results for '0x3b8bc9316853c4fa'

Type bits/keyID cr. time exp time key expir

pub 4096R/6853C4FA 2012-10-17

uid Michael Howe (Sysdey) <michael.howe@it.ox.ac.uk>

sig	sig3	6853C4FA 2012-10-17	[selfsig]
sig	sig	27828C5D 2012-10-17	Michael Howe (Sysdev) <michael.howe@oucs.ox.ac.uk></michael.howe@oucs.ox.ac.uk>
sig	sig	9F7C8DF2 2012-11-08	Dameon Wagner (sysdev) <dameon.wagner@it.ox.ac.uk></dameon.wagner@it.ox.ac.uk>
sig	sig	C20D61FE 2012-11-20	Michael Howe <michael@michaelhowe.org></michael@michaelhowe.org>
sig	sig	F500D17B 2012-12-04	Alexander Dutton <alexander.dutton@it.ox.ac.uk></alexander.dutton@it.ox.ac.uk>
sig	sig	4D694FB2 2014-03-01	Dominic Hargreaves <dom@earth.li></dom@earth.li>
sig	sig	2D7ADF2C 2014-03-02	Jakub Warmuz <iakub@warmuz.org></iakub@warmuz.org>
sig	sig	B4812553 2014-03-02	David North <david@dnorth.net></david@dnorth.net>
sig	sig3	9347F02C 2014-03-11	Alasdair G. Kergon <agk@compsoc.net></agk@compsoc.net>
sig	sig3	53905A01 2014-03-11	Alasdair Kergon <agk@arachsys.com></agk@arachsys.com>
sig	sig3	C43802EB 2014-03-11	Alasdair G Kergon <agk@arachsys.com></agk@arachsys.com>
sig	sig3	567E2C17 2014-03-11	Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com></agk@redhat.com>
sig	sig3	C01E3D67 2014-03-11	Alasdair G Kergon <agk@redhat.com></agk@redhat.com>
sig	sig	C4809D66 2014-10-31	Christopher Hoskin <christopher.hoskin@sant.ox.ac.uk></christopher.hoskin@sant.ox.ac.uk>
sig	sig	847CD202 2015-03-25	Aaron Brady <aaron@insom.me.uk></aaron@insom.me.uk>
sig	sig	21620064 2015-03-26	<u>CheShA (Hack The Planet) <csa@chesha.com></csa@chesha.com></u>
sig	sig	8FEB8EBF 2015-03-28	Andrew McMillan <andrew@morphoss.com></andrew@morphoss.com>
sig	sig	CD2A74E3 2015-03-30	<u>Schrodinger <schrodinger@konundrum.org></schrodinger@konundrum.org></u>
sig	sig	C4A2E57F 2015-04-07	<u>Gavin Atkinson (Work email) <qavin.atkinson@york.ac.uk></qavin.atkinson@york.ac.uk></u>
sig	sig	F49DD87C 2015-04-10	Tony Brett (Following IT Services merger) <tony.brett@it.ox.ac.uk></tony.brett@it.ox.ac.uk>
sig	sig	F4014C41 2015-04-11	Ganesh Sittampalam <ganesh@earth.li></ganesh@earth.li>
sig	sig3	0C5D832F 2015-04-12	Chris Reeves <chris.reeves@iname.com></chris.reeves@iname.com>
sig	sig3	5700415E 2015-04-12	Chris Reeves <chris.reeves@iname.com></chris.reeves@iname.com>
sig	sig3	C2D69803 2015-06-04	<u>Chux Uzoeto (OxUni-Sysdev) <chux.uzoeto@it.ox.ac.uk></chux.uzoeto@it.ox.ac.uk></u>
sig	sig	7FF28888 2015-12-14	Christopher Hoskin <christopher.hoskin@gmail.com></christopher.hoskin@gmail.com>
sig	sig	76AFE3BE 2016-01-20	Robert Bradley (IT Services, University of Oxford) <robert.bradley@it.ox.ac.uk></robert.bradley@it.ox.ac.uk>
sig	sig	59F0093A 2016-01-20	Robert Bradley <robert@robert-bradley.co.uk></robert@robert-bradley.co.uk>
sig	sig	01F71B0D 2016-01-20	Kristian Kocher <kristian.kocher@it.ox.ac.uk></kristian.kocher@it.ox.ac.uk>
sig	sig	D95CF142 2016-01-20	<u>Nigel Brown <nigel.brown@it.ox.ac.uk></nigel.brown@it.ox.ac.uk></u>
sig	sig	235B8E37 2016-01-20	<u>David Hastings <david.hastings@it.ox.ac.uk></david.hastings@it.ox.ac.uk></u>
sig	sig	E6616D64 2016-01-20	David Robertson (Work key) <david.robertson@it.ox.ac.uk></david.robertson@it.ox.ac.uk>
sig	sig	9BCBD606 2016-01-20	<u>Stuart Mozley <stuart.mozley@it.ox.ac.uk></stuart.mozley@it.ox.ac.uk></u>
sig	sig	F2AA5447 2016-01-20	Adrian Cuthbertson (Work key) <adrian.cuthbertson@it.ox.ac.uk></adrian.cuthbertson@it.ox.ac.uk>
sig	sig	C2D69803 2016-01-20	Chux Uzoeto (OxUni-Sysdev) <chux.uzoeto@it.ox.ac.uk></chux.uzoeto@it.ox.ac.uk>

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æ

sub 4096R/386DCBD0 2012-10-17 sig sbind 6853C4FA 2012-10-17 _____

- Encryption
- Signing



Encryption

Signing





Encryption

Signing







Signing







Signing





. . .

A non-exhaustive list:

- Signing mails
- Signing SSL certificate signing requests
- Signing team-internal Debian packages
- Storing passwords with pass (https://www.passwordstore.org)
- Sharing passwords with members of my team
- Validating CSRs and Shibboleth metadata requests



How might you use it?



If you want to be extra safe, check that there's a big block of jumbled characters at the bottom.

Image: A matrix and a matrix

http://xkcd.com/1181/

Don't panic!

Despite all that, don't give up yet!



Work out what you want to do

- Encrypt files in transit (eg Oxfile)
- Assert your identity when communicating with, eg, IT Services



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- Work out what you want to do
 - Encrypt files in transit (eg Oxfile)
 - Assert your identity when communicating with, eg, IT Services
- Start small
- Find a friend
- Know what you're doing before involving non-technical people



Some demonstrations

Here's one I partially prepared earlier...



Using Thunderbird and Enigmail



This is a test, correctly-signed message.

Michael Howe, Infrastructure and Hosting Team Systems Development and Support IT Services, University of Oxford



Using Thunderbird and Enigmail

From Me <michael.howe@it.ox.ac.uk>🈭</michael.howe@it.ox.ac.uk>	◆ Reply → Forward	Redirect 🗖 Archive	🖌 Junk 🛇	Delete 🦉	> ~
Subject This message is not correctly signed				1	1:56
™ Me <michael.howe@it.ox.ac.uk>☆</michael.howe@it.ox.ac.uk>				•	
Enigmail Error - signature verification failed; click on 'Det	ails' button for more inf	ormation		Detai	sƳ
BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE Hash: SHA256					
Be sure to check the signature, in case this messag in transit.	e has been modified				
The cake is not a lie.					
 Michael Howe, Infrastructure and Hosting Team Systems Development and Support IT Services, University of Oxford BGCIN POP SIGNATURE Version: GnuPG v2					
iQLCBAEBCAAGBQ1X88BtAABJEDuLyTFoUET62KCP/ismNTsmTiZ DAGEFEfdCA1tVjG61XKX/TVJeyNgCBUShtpjwqHbQ1WhYCL By1bjintFAEMOMdxCqA7mEJDAvdgTsCbtitnJZCroupc/os afJ2Hc-3H6dAYULHQB1TAbodHXVQYTCBQ1YTEBJEL/S BZNFECOMjFXSShXB1HkBCAWTSAUTFJvoyJzaj/ttbelXELKVeB BZNFECOMjFXSShXB1HkBCAWTSAUTFJvoyJzaj/ttbelXELKVeB BZNFECOMjFXSShXB1HkBCAWTSAUTFJvoyJzaj/ttbelXELKVeB BZNFECOMjFXSShXB1HkBCAWTSAUTFJvoyJzaj/ttbelXELKVeB BZNFECOMjFXSShXB1HkBCAWTSAUTFJvoyJzaj/ttbelXELKVeB BZNFECOMjFXSShXB1HkBCAWTSAUTFJvoyJzaj/ttbelXELKVeB BZNFECOMjFXSShXB1HkBCAWTSAUTFJvoyJzaj/ttbelXELKVeB BZNFECOMjFXSShXB1HkBCAWTSAUTFJvoyJzaj/ttbelXELKVEB BZNFECOMjFXSShXB1HkBCAWTSAUTFJvoyJzaj/ttbelXELKVEB BZNFECOMjFXSShXB1HkBCAWTSAUTFJvoyJzaj/ttbelXELKVEB BZNFECOMJFXSXShXB1HkBCAWTSAUTFJv0 BZNFECOMJFXSXShXB1HKBCAWTSAUTFJv0 BZNFECOMJFXSXShXB1HKBCAWTSAUTFJv0 BZNFECOMJFXSXXShXB1HKBCAWTSAUTFJv0 BZNFECOMJFXSXXShXB1HKBCAWTSAUTFJv0 BZNFECOMJFXSXXShXB1HKBCAWTSAUTFJv0 BZNFECOMJFXSXXShXB1HKBCAWTSAUTFJv0 BZNFECOMJFXSXXShXB1HKBCAWTSAUTFJv0 BZNFECOMJFXSXXShXB1HKBCAWTSAUTFJv0 BZNFECOMJFXSXXShXB1HKBCAWTSAUTFJv0 BZNFECOMJFXSXXShXB1HKBCAWTSAUTFJv0 BZNFECOMJFXSXXShXB1HKBCAWTSAUTFJv0 BZNFECOMJFXSXXShXB1HKBCAWTSAUTFJv0 BZNFECOMJFXSXXSAUTFJv0 BZNFECOMJFXSXXSAUTFJv0 BZNFECOMJFXSXXSAUTFJv0 BZNFECOMJFXSXXSAUTFJv0 BZNFECOMJFXSXXSAUTFJv0 BZNFECOMJFXSXXSAUTFJv0 BZNFECOMJFXSXXSAUTFJv0 BZNFECOMJFXSXXXSAUTFJv0 BZNFECOMJFXSXXXSAUTFJv0 BZNFECOMJFXSXXXSAUTFJv0 BZNFECOMJFXSXXXSAUTFJv0 BZNFECOMJFXSXXXXSAUTFJv0 BZNFECOMJFXSXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX	srZgACigfMTCb vlks5my/X4k2v ljUGOncLfOlaU dZEQ0WirmBQLH wYKhUBklOT7r 4hKgOAd7nvenn IfeGc500WrAK BacKMFQnRQH2BJ YyTeJjKA2rVK1 DmQMa2hW23Uil vfD/TcIG63p9T				
=gNX2 END PGP SIGNATURE			-		OR.
		• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •		E ► - 2	<u>⊧</u>

A whistlestop tour:

- How PGP came to be
- How it works
- How and why it's used, and you might consider using it



A whistlestop tour:

- How PGP came to be
- How it works
- How and why it's used, and you might consider using it
- Anyone interested in keysigning?



Useful resources

Applications

```
GnuPG: https://www.gnupg.org/
GPG4Win: https://www.gpg4win.org/
Enigmail: https://www.enigmail.net/
```

Tutorials

GPG on Windows:

https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/how-use-pgp-windows
GPG on Linux: https:

//help.ubuntu.com/community/GnuPrivacyGuardHowto

Papers

Why Johnny Can't Encrypt: http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1251435 Why Johnny Still, Still Can't Encrypt: https://arxiv.org/abs/1510.08555

Me

michael.howe@it.ox.ac.uk





Any questions?



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Enigmail: https://www.enigmail.net/
```

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