

Providing secure open-access networks

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Providing secure open-access networks

Workshop Outline

- ⦿ Review of the Problem Domain
- ⦿ Designing secure open-access networks
 - ⦿ Incl. software and hardware choices
- ⦿ Implementing secure open-access networks
 - ⦿ OUCS and Libraries
- ⦿ Q & A



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Problem Domain

- ⦿ Summer 2003 : large-scale Internet worms
- ⦿ Widespread laptop use
- ⦿ Catch-22 for software updates
- ⦿ Network security \Leftrightarrow University business



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Statutes and Regulations

- ◉ ICTC Regulations
 - ◉ Monitoring (4)
 - ◉ Viruses (7.11)
 - ◉ Resources (13.2, 13.3)
- ◉ JANET Acceptable Use Policy
 - ◉ Non-member use



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Designing the Network



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Use Cases (1)

- ⦿ Vital!
- ⦿ Humans - Who
- ⦿ Applications - What
- ⦿ Computers - How
- ⦿ Locations – Where & When



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Use Cases (2)

- OUCS Helpcentre
 - MS, Antivirus updates
- Building visitors
 - Lectures, Conferences
- Larger scale non-full-member
 - Library Readers – odd services



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Network Integration (1)

- ⦿ Cabling and Switch-gear
 - ⦿ Mix-in with existing infrastructure
 - ⦿ New or refurbished facility
- ⦿ Labelling and Identification
 - ⦿ Distribution cables
 - ⦿ Port faceplates



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Network Integration (2)

- ⦿ IP space
 - ⦿ Address and port translation
- ⦿ Hardware Configuration
 - ⦿ Backup management
 - ⦿ Avoid the replacement-exposure problem



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Managing Users

- ⦿ Controlled access
 - ⦿ Physical, to the building
 - ⦿ Virtual, to the network
- ⦿ Accounting
 - ⦿ Open-access means unknown user?
- ⦿ Supervision



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Network Access

- ◉ Firewall rules
 - ◉ Refer to the Use Case
- ◉ OUCS – restricted
 - ◉ Official service servers only
 - ◉ Transparent HTTP redirect
 - ◉ Default deny in both directions



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Basic Topologies

- ⦿ VLANs
 - ⦿ Vendor support
- ⦿ NAT
 - ⦿ Software or Appliance
- ⦿ DHCP
 - ⦿ Client support (MacOS pre-X)



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Hardware

- Off the shelf appliances
 - Cisco PIX – DHCP & NAT
- Open Source
 - Linux/*BSD with daemons
- Black box solutions
 - Bluesocket – Web interface



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Software

- ⦿ Packet Filtering
 - ⦿ iptables / ipfw
- ⦿ Scanning
 - ⦿ Commercial
 - ⦿ Various - see Google
 - ⦿ Non-commercial
 - ⦿ nmap, nessus



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Implementing the Network



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
OUCS Visitors Network (1)

- ⦿ Mix-in with existing helpcentre network
- ⦿ VLAN per user into managing devices
- ⦿ Minimum ongoing maintenance
- ⦿ No peer to peer communications
- ⦿ Intended for MS/AV updates and teachers
- ⦿ Restrictive service



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OUCS Visitors Network (2)





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OUCS Visitors Network (3)

- ⦿ Access Control List:
 - ⦿ Default deny Incoming and Outgoing
 - ⦿ OUCS : NTP, DNS, SMTP, HFS, NNTP, VPN
 - ⦿ Also SSH, FTP, POP, IMAP to anywhere
 - ⦿ OLIS on the telnet port
- ⦿ Transparent HTTP redirect via OUCS proxy
- ⦿ Minimal accounting; limited availability



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
Libraries Reader Network (1)

- ⦿ Permissive service due to user requirements
 - ⦿ Orthogonal to OUCS service
- ⦿ Large number of (potential) users
 - ⦿ Need to pre-register
- ⦿ Multiple sites and networks
 - ⦿ No site-local IT support



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Libraries Reader Network (2)





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Libraries Reader Network (3)

- ⦿ Known limitations:
 - ⦿ Possible post-registration infection
 - ⦿ Annual registration expiry
 - ⦿ Client ⇔ Scanning Station incompatibility



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Q & A