

Brief overview

- Codename for the next major version of Windows
- Major release (although most technologies have been seen before)
- Currently in alpha technical previews
- Due for release 2005-2006? (when ready!)
- Interim updates
 - e.g. Windows XP Service Pack 2
 - Windows 2003 Server "SE"

Longhorn Architecture





Aero



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
Registossa

Windows Media Player

Financy.

.

Ver Play Tools Helts





Avalon

The Avalon Approach

- Unified approach to UI, Documents, and Media
 - Integration as part of development and experience
- Integrated, vector-based composition engine
 - Utilizing the power of the PC throughout the graphics stack
- Declarative programming
 - Bringing designers directly into application development

Integration – The Guiding Vision

Avalon - the integrated platform for UI, Media, and Documents

- UI, Media, and Documents share the benefits of a new stack built from the bottom up
- Anchored on the .NET Framework and Direct3D
- Parallel procedural and declarative models


UI

 \bigcirc

- Flexible component architecture
- Layout services
- Two-way transformable data binding

Media

- Graphics
- Audio, video, animation
- Documents
 - Fixed, flow, and adaptive layouts
 - Pagination/printing
 - Rights management



Developer Experience Best of Web, Best of Windows

Bringing together the advantages from both worlds

Web

- seamless deployment, update, and administration
- flowable layout
- progressive download and rendering
- declarative model (textbased markup)

Windows

- unrestricted functionality
- integration with Windows desktop
- good offline support
- scalability/performance
- broad developer language and tools support


Developer Experience Declarative Programming

- Extensible Application Markup codenamed XAML
 - One-to-one correspondence with object model
 - Key role in enabling interoperation between UI authoring tools and developer tools
- Fundamental XAML concepts:
 - Markup can contain code
 - Markup can be compiled for execution
 - Markup and procedural code are peers in functionality and performance

XAML


<Canvas xmlns="http://schemas.microsoft.com/2003/xaml" Background="LightCyan" Width="100%" Height="100%"> <Image Source="lh.bmp" Canvas.Left="5" Canvas.Top="5" /> <Text Canvas.Left="90" Canvas.Top="20" FontSize="36">Hello, Longhorn! </Text>

</Canvas>



Indigo

Indigo Architecture



"Indigo" Security Goals

- Provide message-based security leveraging Web Service Security standards
- Provide simple, constrained, out-of-box security solutions that meet most application security requirements
- Provide adequate flexibility for customizing security solutions
- Provide extensibility for authentication, authorization, token types, security providers

Turn-Key Deployment Configuration and Profiles


- Define security profiles which indicate how security requirements are to be satisfied
- Developer or deployer may define their own security profiles
- Common security profiles are predefined in machine.config
- A scope of messages are bound to a security profile

WinFS

WinFS Is

- All end-user data lives in Longhorn
- New user experience in Longhorn Shell
- A trustworthy place to store data
- Data model built on relational database technology
- Filesystem capabilities built on NTFS
- Everyday Information domain-specific schemas
- Services that make data active


WinFS Data Model



Items

- The new atomic unit of data
 - Items have subsumed Files
 - Copy, put in Folders, etc.
- A group of simple and complex types that represent data
 - Defined in a schema, arranged in types
- Structured, Semi-Structured, and, Opaque
- Persisted
- Relationships
 - Explicitly relate Items together
 - E.g.; Author binds Document to Contact
 - Schema can model complex items
 - Containment, reference, embedding, categories, etc.
- Extensions
 - Provide ability to add new data to existing Item types

WinFS Schemas



Windows Everyday Information

- Documents, Messages, Annotations, Notes
- Media, Audio, Video, Images
- Events, Appointments, Locations, UserTask
- Windows System
 - SystemTasks, Config, Programs
 - Explorer, Help, Security
- New Schemas
 - Developers can define own data shape
 - Comprised of
 - Scalars
 - Complex Types
 - XML
 - Binary/Filestream

Example

WinFS Schema

<ItemType Name="Person"</pre> BaseType="Core.Contact" ... > <Property Name="PersonalNames"</pre> Type="MultiSet" MultiSetOfType="FullName" Nullable="true"> <Property Name="AddressLine" Type="WinFS.String" Nullable="true"> <RelationshipType Name="Employment" BaseType="WinFS.Relationship" AllowsHolding="true" AllowsEmbedding="false" AllowsReference="true"> <Property Name="IrisScan" Type="WinFS.FileStream" .../> </ItemType>

NTFS stream


Table View of Person

ItemId	Name	Addresses	IrisScan
	FirstName LastName	Street City State Zip Street City State Zip Street City State Zip	

Longhorn And Filesystems

- Files can live solely in an NTFS volume
 - Available for boot
 - E.g., C:\Windows is in NTFS
 - Volume can be mounted on down level machine
 - E.g., Firewire drive on both XP and Longhorn
- Items can live solely in WinFS
 - File-backed Items
 - Accessible through standard Win32 APIs
 - Metadata Handlers get data in and out of file streams
 - User data moved into WinFS
 - I.e., C:\Documents and Settings
 - Has Import/Export utilities

WinFS Services Synchronization



- Synchronize one WinFS with another
 - Keep My Contacts and My Files in sync across my home machines
 - Peer to Peer sharing
- Synchronize WinFS with other data sources
 - Keep My Contacts in sync with online email contacts, enterprise CRM, etc.

Synchronization Overview

Approach

- Multi-master replication
 - Replicas make changes independently
- Net-change synchronization
 - Looking at cumulative changes, not logs
- A set of common services for all data sources and all schemas
 - Change tracking, change enumeration, conflict handling, etc.

Extending

- Schema design
 - Granularity of change units is declared in the WinFS schemas
- Custom conflict resolution handlers
 - Extend the system conflict policies with code
- Synchronization Adaptors
 - Outside datasources for one way or bidirectional synchronization

Synchronization Manager

		Resolve Details	Start Stop	emovable drive
	32 MB does not fit	e Disk full	Name Removable	ype to filter Il partnerships vevices
	13 MB, 2 minutes to go	3 conflicts	myPhone	his computer onflicts rrors
	3 minutes to go	in progress	PocketPC	
10:09		o continuous	MariekesLa	and a branching
🕒 Error				
	3 minutes to go	₩ # -		Properties

WinFS Services InfoAgent



Users want to control how their PCs behave

- It's called a personal computer after all
- Every aspect of the system can be personalized
- InfoAgent enables rich, flexible customization
 - "When I receive a high priority email from a customer, show me a popup message if I'm at my desk, otherwise forward it to my cell phone"
 - "When I download new photos from my camera.

Notifications And InfoAgent

Preferences

'Active Data' – Subscribe to WinFS changes

- Item change subscriptions
- Item Domain containment/query subscriptions


InfoAgent Integration

Inclusive set of events, contexts, and actions

Events

Contexts

- Preferences stored as WinFS items
- Unified management of notification rules



Microsoft Shell

Microsoft Shell

Problem

- Weak cmd shell
 Weak language
 spotty coverage
 GUI focus
 Hard to automate
 SDK Focus
 - Programmers


Solution: MSH

- Foundation for taskbased management
- Focused on power users and admins
- Provides:
 - Interactive shell
 - Cmdlets
 - Utilities
 - Scripting language
 - Remote scripting

Core Concepts

Command line scripting language
 Best of sh/ksh, Perl/Ruby, DCL/CL
 Commands are classes (Cmdlets)
 Hosting model

How It Works



Parameters And Confirmation

```
[CommandDeclaration("stop", "ps")]
public class StopPs: Cmdlet
```

```
[ParsingMandatoryParameter]
[ParsingPromptString("Name of the process")]
```

```
public string ProcessName;
public override void ProcessRecord()
```

```
Process [ ]ps;
ps = Process.GetProcessesByName(ProcessName);
foreach (Process p in ps)
```

if (ConfirmProcessing(p.ProcessName))

```
p.Kill();
```

}

Navigation Provider

```
[ProviderDeclaration("REG", "Registry",
ProviderCapabilityFlags.None)]
public class RegistryProvider : NavigationCmdletBase
{
  protected override void GetItem(string path)
  {
    RegistryKey key = GetRegkeyForPath(path, false);
    if (key == null)
    { WriteErrorObject(path,
       new ArgumentException("does not exist"));
    }
    WriteObject(key);
  }
```


Application Automation

"UI Automation" defined

 – code that programmatically drives another application's UI to yield a desired result

- Gather information about the UI
 - Dynamically discover UI structure
 - Extract property information
 - Receive event notifications when UI changes
 - Query an element for its behavior
- Interact with UI elements
 - Click a button, scroll a list, move a window, etc.
 - Inject keystrokes and mouse input

Longhorn Model: UI Automation



Windows UI Automation

- Automation framework built into Longhorn
 - Platform-level support for automating all UI elements
 - Avalon, WinForms, Win32, Visual Basic, etc.
 - Exposes a consistent object model for all controls
 - 3rd party controls easily integrate into model
 - Security Model client must be trusted
 - Locale, machine, and resolution independent

Creates new opportunities for innovation in:

- Automated UI Testing
- Assistive Technology Products
- Command-and-Control Utilities

UI Automation Overview

- Logical Tree structure of the UI
 - Stitches all UI trees into one coherent structure
 - Eliminates unnecessary elements
 - Resembles the structure perceived by an end user
- Properties important UI information
 - Name, Bounding Rectangle, Persistent ID, etc.
- Events notification of UI changes

Window creation, change in focus or selection, etc

- Control Patterns control behavior
 - Scroll, Selection, Window, ExpandCollapse, etc.
- Input simple mouse and keyboard input

UI Automation Control Patterns

- Mutually exclusive classes of control behavior
- Control developers (providers) expose these patterns for new or existing controls
- Automation developers (clients) use patterns to
 - Discover what functionality a control offers
 - Gather pattern-specific property information
 - Receive pattern-specific events
 - Programmatically manipulate the control

Examples:

- Button: Invoke
- ListBox: Scroll, Selection
- ComboBox: Scroll, Selection, ExpandCollapse

Security Model

- No default automation permissions
- UI Automation functionality is protected according to the following permissions:
 - Read Navigate tree, get properties, receive events
 - Write Call control pattern methods
 - Input Call methods in the Input class
- Access to Rights Managed requires additional permissions

Longhorn

Deployment

Matthew J. Dovey Oxford University Computing Service

ClickOnce Vision

Bring the ease & reliability of web application deployment to client applications.

The Best of the Client & Web

	Web	Click Once	MSI Client
Reach	Y		
No Touch Deployment	Y	Υ	
Low System Impact	Y	Υ	
Install/Run Per-User	Y	Υ	
Rich / Interactive		Υ	Y
Offline		Y	Y
Windows Shell Integration		Υ	Y
Per-Machine/Shared Components			Y
Unrestricted Install			Y

Install Goals

Reduce install fragility Allow what's low impact Ex. App file copy, start menu integration, etc... Can always undo what was installed Disallow what's not low impact Apps never run with admin rights (LUA) Driver registration, COM objects, etc... Custom actions; large source of install uncertainty Expand the definition of "low impact" Requires OS Changes. Starts with Longhorn

Declarative Install

Application Manifest Describes the application Ex.. What assemblies constitute the app Authored by the developer Deployment Manifest Describes the application deployment Ex. What version clients should run Authored by the administrator

MyApp.Deploy

Identity

<assemblyIdentity name="TaskVision.deploy" version="1.0.0.0" publicKeyToken="..." processorArchitecture="x86" asmv2:culture="en-US" />

<description asmv2:publisher="Microsoft" asmv2:product="TaskVision"> </description>

MyApp.Deploy

Identity Deployment


<deployment isRequiredUpdate="false" >

<install shellVisible="true" />

<subscription> <update> <beforeApplicationStartup /> <periodic> <minElapsedTimeAllowed time="0" unit="hours" /> </periodic> </update> </subscription>

</deployment>

MyApp.Deploy




<dependency>

<dependentAssembly> <assemblyIdentity name="TaskVision.manifest" version="1.0.0.0" publicKeyToken="..." processorArchitecture="x86" asmv2:culture="en-US" /> </dependentAssembly>

<asmv2:installFrom codebase="1.0.0.0/TV.manifest" />

</dependency>

MyApp.Deploy



<Signature > <SignedInfo> <Reference URI=""> <DigestMethod Algorithm="http://..." /> <DigestValue>2xKk...</DigestValue> </Reference> </SignedInfo>

<SignatureValue>vNTBod96H7k...</SignatureValue>

<KeyInfo> <KeyValue> <RSAKeyValue> <Modulus>+Wnh5RN9...</Modulus> <Exponent>AQAB</Exponent> </RSAKeyValue> </KeyValue> </KeyInfo> </Signature>

Application Manifest

MyApp.Manifest



<assemblyIdentity name="TaskVision.deploy" version="1.0.0.0" publicKeyToken="..." processorArchitecture="x86" asmv2:culture="en-US" />

Deployment Options

Installed' Applications
 From Web, UNC or CD
 Start Menu, Add/Remove Programs
 Varied update options

'Launched' Applications
App launches but doesn't "install"
No Start Menu, Add/Remove Programs
Always update on launch

Update Options

On App Startup

- If found, ask user to update app
- After App Startup
 - If found, ask user to update on next run
- Programmatic
 - Integrate update experience into app
- Required
 - Update can specify minimum version required
- Background Updates
 - Updates drizzle in silently like Windows Updates
 - "Longhorn" only

Secure Updates

Only the original deployer can update
 No auto-deployment of viruses
 Manifests are signed
 XMLDSIG
 Deployer key needed to publish updates

"Longhorn Web" Apps

Integrated with Browser Install UI built into browser Best possible user experience Leverages Avalon app/navigation model No shell presence (ex. Start Menu shortcut) Runs in semi-trust Progressive Install App automatically installs as it's used File level install

When Should I Use The Windows Installer (MSI)?

- ClickOnce is the solution for new selfcontained applications
 - Low System Impact
 - No Touch Deployment
 - Install / Run Per-User
 - Rich Interactive applications
- Use Windows Installer if you need to
 - Install Shared Resources
 - Install Win32 Applications
 - Perform custom actions during installation


ClickOnce And Windows Installer (MSI)

	Click	MSI	
	Once	Client	
No Touch Deployment	Y		
Low System Impact	Y	Y*	
Install/Run Per-User	Y	Y	
Rich / Interactive	Y	Y	
Offline	Y	Υ	
Windows Shell Integration	Y	Y	
Per-Machine/Shared Components		Y	
Unrestricted Install		Y	

* MSI applications can be authored for "low system impact"

Windows Installer Basics MSI

- MSI database
 - Populated by setup developer
 - .MSI file extension
 - One per product
 - Described in relational tables
- Products have
 - Features
 - Components
 - Installable resources
 - Entry points



Windows Installer Basics .MSP

- MSP is a Windows Installer patch package
- Patches make changes to the configuration information database and resources (files, registry)
- Patch package (MSP) contains
 - Summary Information Stream
 - Transforms
 - Cabinet file

Windows Installer v4.0 MSI 40

Longhorn extensions

 MSI will support new Longhorn shell extension manifest

No-Reboot support for setup / updates

- MSI detects processes holding files in use
- Sends notification to processes
- Design your applications to save state, shutdown and resume

Windows Installer v4.0 Image Based Setup

- Longhorn uses a new Image Based Setup model
 - Minimizes number of images
 - Deployment of Windows + Applications is faster
 - Images can be maintained, serviced & modified offline/online

MSI applications can be deployed with Images

- FASTOEM property is used by major OEMs to speed up factory floor setup
- Files copied with the OS image
- Installation and configuration are done on first boot

Longhorn


Identity

Matthew J. Dovey Oxford University Computing Service

The Identity System

- Ubiquitous store, development platform for applications that consume identity
 - Built on "WinFS" storage subsystem (CLI201)
 - Schema for unified representation of identity
 - API with specialized types, methods for principals
- Provides recognition between principals
 - Bootstrap and manage recognition between people, computers, groups, organizations
 - Extends Windows security services, can be used by existing applications
- Principals can be serialized, exchanged using document we call an "Information Card"


What is an Information Card?



Exchangeable identity statement allowing verification of signature

How Are Information Cards Used?

- Information Cards are used to manage secure digital relationships with people and organizations
- When an Information Card is imported, it becomes a contact in the contact explorer
 - Can be recognized using Windows security services (SSPI)
 - Can be granted access to shared spaces
- Will seek broad adoption of Information Card, encourage others to implement



Identity-Based Host Firewall

- Only people you recognize and to whom granted access can make inbound connections to your computer
- Other callers see IPSEC negotiation port, nothing else
- Greatly reduces exposed attack surface of a Windows computer on a network

Authentication Versus Authorization

- Accepting an Information Card does not grant a contact access to the computer
 - Recognition only clear separation of authentication, authorization
 - A contact must have no implicit access
- To revoke someone's access to computer
 - Remove from access policies on resources
 - Optionally, delete contact object, no longer recognize that person
- E.g.
 - Person to Person WinFS Sync with "Castle"s
 - Person to Organisation
 - Organisation to Organisation

Tracking Disclosed Information

- Identity system tracks Information Card disclosure
 - To whom Information Cards were sent
 - What information was sent
- If information changes, can selectively or automatically send updates
 - Updates signed thus known to be from you, can process automatically at destination
 - For example: your mailing address changes automatically update magazine subscriptions

Roaming

- Within home: "Castle" replicates data
- Within organization
 - Credentials, data stored in Active Directory
 - Download to Identity System on clients
- To arbitrary other computers
 - Identity system data can be backed up, encrypted, and stored in vault in "cloud"
- Can also use combination smartcard storage "dongle" for any of the above

Identity Loss and Recovery

- What happens if your computer dies?
 - If a "Castle", data is on other computer(s)
 - Or, restore from system backup
- Mechanisms used for roaming can also apply to recovery
 - Upload from smart dongle
 - Download from vault in cloud or from Active Directory

Identity Theft

What if computer, smart dongle is stolen?

- Send signed revocation message to people you have sent an Information Card
- If backup in cloud vault, service could send revocation for you, like canceling credit card
- Bootstrap replacement identity using disclosure information from backup
- How know if identity has been stolen?
 - How discover this today? For example, by checking credit card statement
 - May need similar mechanisms online

Longhorn

Trustworthiness and Security

Matthew J. Dovey Oxford University Computing Service

Trustworthy Commitment


Microsoft Cultural Shift

- Thousands of hours spent in security reviews on .NET Framework to date
- Foundstone, @Stake security reviews
- "Hardening" the .NET Framework
- Making Security Easier for Customers
 - Prescriptive Architectural Guidance
 - Feature changes in .NET Framework

SECSYM: Security Symposium ARC340: CLR Under the Covers: .Net Framework Application Security

Right Privilege At The Right Time

- User accounts (Only two account types)
 - Normal users runs with least-privileged
 - Admin users runs with least-privileged
 - Admin applications need privilege elevation
 - Only trusted applications get to run with elevated privilege



Trust Evaluation Process

Code validation is a human decision

- Authenticode signed manifests
 - Certificate in the store
- Domain administrators signed
 - Deployment manifest
- Local administrators blessed
 - All machine have a signing key

Default behavior changed by policy

Security: The Sandbox (SEE)

- Apps run in secure sandbox by default
 - Similar to IE javascript
 - Ensures applications are safe to run
- Increased sandbox size
 - "Longhorn" > "Whidbey" > .NET V1.1
- VS helps author for the sandbox
 - Debug in Zone
 - PermissionCalc
 - Security Exception helper

Security: Sandbox Restrictions

Some apps need more permission
 Un-managed code access

 Export to Excel or any MS Office integration
 Un-restricted file access
 Un-restricted network access

Security: Policy Deployment

- Application level policy
 - "Trust this app"
 - "App" defined by it's app manifest
 - Baked into core CLR security
- Trust Licenses
 - License issued by admin, deployed with app
 - License indicates admin says app is trusted
 - Requires only one-time (ever) client touch
 - To configure trusted license issuer

TrustManager

Decides if app needs additional trust

- Requested permissions beyond default
- No previous trusted version
- No admin policy
- Display user prompt if necessary
- ITrustManagerConfig
 - Control when / how prompting happens

User Consent

Admins should make trust decisions, but... Not always possible Home users are their own admin • Users make trust decisions all the time Putting a CD in their computer Installing software Submitting a Credit card to a web page

User Consent Design

App request permissions needed Requests specified in app manifest VS helps identify needed permissions Prompt is simple & binary Happens at install / 1st launch Combined Install & Trust Prompt • User prompted if: App needs permissions above the sandbox Admin has configured to allow prompting

Code Access Security (CAS)

Based on trust of code

- Recognizes that trusted users (e.g. admin) run less trusted code (e.g. browsing the web)
- System intersects rights of code with rights of user
 = 2 levels of defense

Key features


- Evidence (location, signature, etc.) is combined with policy to grant permissions to code
- Protected operations require permissions
- All callers must have permissions so bad code cannot "trick" good code and be exploited

CAS: How It Works

- Managed code verifiably robust
 - No buffer overruns! No unsafe casting!
 - Only well-defined interactions (no ptrs)
 - Components can protect their interfaces
- Trusted libraries as security gate keepers
 - Before doing a protected operations, library demands permission of its callers
 - Stack walk all callers must have permission to proceed; otherwise exception prevents it
 - When demand succeeds the library can override (Assert) and do the operation safely

Code Access Security (CAS)

Demand must be satisfied by all callers
 Ensures all code in causal chain is authorized
 Cannot exploit other code with more privilege



What Is The Secure Execution Environment?

- A new platform for secure applications
- Code written to the SEE is inherently more secure because only safe operations are possible within it
- Security restrictions are enforced by CLR
- Permission Elevation is possible in a declarative and predictable way, and there is a user experience.
- The SEE is simply a default grant set of set of Code Access Security permissions

Why Code To The SEE?

- Deploy without Trust Dialogs!
- Reduce test surface
- You know that your code cannot harm users machine
- Reduce TCO
 - Business: admin doesn't have to worry about what the code might do.
 - Home: SEE app cannot harm your machine

Why The SEE Is Safe

SEE applications

- All code has only limited safe permissions
- Can only use SEE-approved trusted libraries
- Security principles
 - Code can further restrict self to least privilege
 - Application isolation
 - Library code is limited to a known safe set

Limited User Account(LUA) Protected Admin (PA) Application Impact Management

LUA Problem Statement

Running with elevated privilege leads to disasters

- One reason why viruses can cause damaged is because too many people run with full privilege
- Wash Post even is telling us to run without privilege
- Every Admin tells us they want to limit users, but...
- Most people demand to run as admin because:
 - Rich web experience, dependant on ActiveX installation, currently requires admin privilege
 - "If we don't run as admin, stuff breaks"
 - Testing is really easy when everyone's an admin!
 - Everything works including malicious code!
- Customers want tools and help
 - "Please help us to get applications that run with Least Privilege"
 - Win98 & XP users are admin, so apps are built for admin
 - This is the vicious circle that we must break

LUA – The Good And The Bad

- Long term: we will greatly improve the TCO and "Secure by Deployment" story with Limited User
- LUA apps have no legitimate reason to ask for admin privilege
- Good LUA apps do not try to change system or domain state – they work on XP today as LUA
- Bad LUA apps (the majority) inadvertently change system state
- Short term: some LUA apps will not be fixable by Application Impact Management
 - The target is to have only 20% of apps in this category
 - The expected behavior is that these apps will fail for 93 Longhorn

Three Customers For LUA

Fully locked down corporations

- Lots of research shows that the enterprise admin wants this feature
- Reduce security threats
- Reduce number of apps loaded
- Reduce TCO
- Admins that need a safe place to run apps
 - Should have the least privilege needed by app
- At Home where the admin wants to increase security
 - Parental controls, so that the child uses only ageappropriate apps
 - User self lockdown to protect PC from security problems

LUA In Longhorn

- All applications will have a manifest listing the application parts
 - Enabling Windows to provide a safe environment for the application to run.
 - All applications will undergo a Trust Evaluation
- Contain applications to limit potential damage
- Create Compartments where code can run
 - Least-privileged User Account (LUA)
 - Most apps can run with user privileges in user space
 - Apps run in LUA space by default in LH
 - Admin Privilege (Protected Admin)
 - Only trusted applications will run with admin privilege in admin space
 - Admine will not enable PA if LLIA is not useful

App Operations Built for SEE

Apps

Fixable Admin → LUA Apps (AIM)

Full Admin Apps

Code Validation Process

All code validation is a human decision

- Publishers can get signed app manifest (need to be in cert store)
- Domain admins can sign deployment manifest (enterprise store)
- Local admins can "bless" apps
- By policy user can decide to change default behavior
- All local validation decisions are preserved in App Context
- Code Integrity is assured by checking every .EXE and .DLL for validity
- Application trust is assured at Runtime

Application Impact Management And LUA/PA

- All system impact changes are logged for potential rollback on uninstall
- LUA & Admin apps will have their impactful registry writes monitored as well
- Apps are given their own view of certain files & regkeys

User Experience Goals

- Longhorn is Secure by Default yet the system is as flexible and easy to use as Windows XP
- Users know when they are about to do something potentially unsafe and are able to make an informed decision
 - Longhorn always gives strong Security recommendations
 - Users can undo damaging changes
- Users feel confident they can install or run any program without compromising their data or their PCs
 - They feel that, compared to previous versions of Windows, Longhorn is much safer.
 - They trust Longhorn more than any other OS
- Users do not need to learn any major new concepts or procedures to be protected

Other Big Changes

Winlogon is being rewritten for Longhorn

- Addressing reliability issues too many unnecessary processes in Winlogon
- Addressing performance issues too many unnecessary components loaded in Winlogon
- Winlogon in Longhorn will no longer support replaceable GINAs, new mechanisms provide existing functionality
 - New, simpler Credential Provider model
 - Eventing mechanism
 - Stacking/chaining

Longhorn

Next Generation Secure Computing Base

Matthew J. Dovey Oxford University Computing Service

Next Generation Secure Computing Base Defined

- Microsoft's Next-Generation Secure Computing Base (NGSCB) is a new security technology for the Microsoft Windows platform
 - Uses both hardware and software to protect data
 - Offers new kinds of security and privacy protections in an interconnected world

Threats Mitigated in V1

Tampering with Data

- Strong process isolation prevents rogue applications from changing our data or code while it is running
- Sealed storage verifies the integrity of data when unsealing it

Information Disclosure

Sealed storage prevents rogue applications from getting at your encrypted data


Repudiation

- Attestation enables you to verify that you are dealing with an application and machine configuration you trust
- Spoofing Identity
 - Secure path enables you to be sure that you're dealing with the real user, not an application spoofing the user

Version 1 Details

Fully aligned with Longhorn

- Ships as part of Longhorn
- Betas and other releases in synch with and delivered with Longhorn's
- Focused on enterprise applications
- Example opportunities:
 - Document signing
 - Secure IM
 - Internal applications for viewing secure data
 - Secure email plug-in
- Hardware based on
 - Trusted Computer Group (https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/home)
 - Memory protection (AMD and Intel Prescott CPUs)



Nexus Mode Environment

Basic Operating System Functions

- Process and Thread Loader/Manager
- Memory Manager
- I/O Manager
- Security Reference Monitor
- Interrupt handling/Hardware abstraction
- But not a complete Operating System
 - No File System
 - No Networking
 - No Kernel Mode/Privileged Device Drivers
 - No Direct X
 - No Scheduling
 - No...
- Kernel mode has no pluggables
 - All of the kernel loaded at boot and in the PCR

NGSCB Features

- All NGSCB-enabled application capabilities build off of four key features
 - Strong process isolation
 - Sealed storage
 - Secure path
 - Attestation
- The first three are needed to protect against malicious code
- Attestation breaks new ground in distributed computing
 - "Subjects" (software, machines, services) can be securely authenticated
 - This is separate from user authentication

Summary

- NGSCB ships as part of Longhorn
- NGSCB is a combination of
 - New hardware which creates a secure environment for...
 - ...A new kernel, called the Nexus, which...
 - ...Will run agents in a secure memory partition, and which...
 - ...Will provide these agents with security services so that they can...
 - …Provide users with trustworthy computing

Remember that:

- When the Nexus is turned off, literally everything runs just like before
- When the Nexus is on, the LHS runs very close to everything that ever ran
- The Nexus makes no claims about what runs on the LHS
- The hardware should run any Nexus, and give full function to any Nexus (with, at most, an admin step by the user)
- The Nexus will run any software the user tells it to

Longhorn

Questions

Matthew J. Dovey Oxford University Computing Service

Sources

Longhorn Development Centre
 http://msdn.microsoft.com/longhorn/

Trusted Computer Group
 https://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/home